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Abstract 
This article reflects on context effects in the study of behavioral ethics and organizational 
justice. After a general overview, we review three key challenges confronting research in 
these two domains. First, we consider social scientific vs. normative approaches to inquiry. 
The former aims for a scientific description, while the later aims to provide prescriptive 
advice for moral conduct. We argue that the social scientific view can be enriched by 
considering normative paradigms. The next challenge we consider, involves the duality of 
morally upright vs. morally inappropriate behavior. We observe that there is a long tradition 
of categorizing behavior dichotomously (e.g., good vs. bad) rather than continuously. We 
conclude by observing that more research is needed to compare the dichotomous vs. 
continuous perspectives. Third, we examine the role of “cold” cognitions and “hot” affect in 
making judgments of ethicality. Historically speaking, research has empathized cognition, 
though recent work has begun to add greater balance to affective reactions. We argue that 
both cognition and affect are important, but more research is needed to determine how they 
work together. After considering these three challenges, we then turn to our special issue, 
providing short reviews of each contribution and how they help in better addressing the three 
challenges we have identified.  
Keywords: organizational justice, behavioral ethics, workplace fairness 
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Beyond the Particular and Universal: Dependence, Independence, and Interdependence 
of Context, Justice, and Ethics 
A perpetual challenge faced by working people is to make judgments of fairness and 
ethics, both to understand the behavior of others but also to decide how to act themselves 
(Treviño, 1986). Neither these judgments nor the resulting behaviors occur in a contextual 
vacuum (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Rather, decisions and actions are impacted by the 
setting and circumstances in which they occur (e.g., Barnett & Vaicys, 2000; Douglas, 
Davidson, & Schwartz, 2001; Kelly & Elm, 2003; Nicklin, Geenbaum, McNall, Folger, & 
Williams, 2011). These context effects have long fascinated researchers in the fields of 
justice and ethics. For example, Deutsch (1975) argued that distributive fairness judgments 
may be grounded in shared societal or group values, and as these values differ so will the 
resulting judgments.  If a collective favored equity, then the fairest distribution would reward 
people proportional to their work contributions. If a collective favored equality, then the 
fairest rewards would be those that treated all group members similarly. Finally, if need was 
favored, then rewards should be allowed based upon the basic requirements of members. 
Likewise, in a later study, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) explored when an action was likely 
to be “moralized” or understood in ethical terms. Haidt and his colleagues found that the 
moralization of behavior may be influenced by socio-economic status, cultural norms, and 
culturally-shaped expectations.  
Even as some scholars have searched for universal ethical standards (e.g., Gauthier, 
Pettifor, & Ferrero, 2010; Schwartz, 2005; Strentz, 2002), context effects remain important. 
For they may influence our own -- and our judgment of others’ - behaviors and actions. As 
Bazerman and Gino (2012) neatly summarize, “most of the unethical behavior we observe in 
organizations and society more broadly is the result of the actions of several individuals who, 
although they value morality and want to be seen as ethical people, regularly fail to resist the 
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temptation to act dishonestly or even fail to recognize that there is a moral issue at stake in 
the decision they are making” (p. 91). In short, context interferes with people’s self-predicted 
behaviors. 
While researchers have begun to explore the general mechanisms linking notions of 
behavioral ethics to organizational justice (cf. De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Cropanzano & 
Stein, 2009) and to criterion variables such as engagement or satisfaction at work (Crawshaw, 
Cropanzano, Bell, & Nadisic, 2013), to date this work has been rather context-neutral (cf. 
Fortin, 2008).  This special issue seeks to add to the emerging field of enquiry that lies at the 
intersection of organizational justice and behavioral ethics. Beyond this, the nine papers 
presented herein examine important contextual influences on just and ethical behavior -- and 
perceptions of justice and ethics -- at work. These articles also speak to recent developments 
and persistent challenges in both organizational justice and behavioral ethics, which we feel 
makes integration between these fields more rewarding. Before discussing the individual 
papers in more depth, we briefly review three of these contemporary trends and current 
challenges. 
Social Scientific Versus Normative Approaches to  
Behavioral Ethics and Organizational Justice 
The first challenge faced by organizational justice and behavioral ethics research, 
concerns their respective interfaces with normative-philosophical fields of study. Both 
organizational justice and behavioral ethics are social scientific disciplines (Fortin, 2008). As 
such, they focus on describing and predicting the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of people 
(Fortin & Fellenz, 2008; Goldman & Cropanzano, in press). Yet both fields are also closely 
related to neighboring normative-philosophical fields, specifically the prescriptive fields of 
normative justice and normative ethics (Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013). Organizational 
justice and ethics have both gone through recent struggles in attempting to delineate the 
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intersection to these normative fields (cf., Tenbrunsel & Crowe 2008; Cugueró-Escofet & 
Fortin, 2013).  
Normative considerations within behavioral ethics. Behavioral ethics scholars have 
tended to pay more heed to the interface between social science research and normative 
philosophical considerations than have their counterparts in organizational justice. Indeed, 
some behavioral ethics scholars have maintained that the interface problem lies at the very 
core of the definition of the field. Tenbrunsel and Crowe (2008), for example, argue that it is 
crucial to define what is ethical or moral, “for without a universal understanding of the core 
dependent variable, research will remain inconsistent, incoherent, and atheoretical” (p. 548). 
Similarly, Kluver, Fazier, and Haidt (2014) contend that “we must establish some sort of 
normative framework, so that we can say when or why a particular manipulation or 
intervention will make people behave in a more ethical way.”  The problem is that even 
though behavioral ethics is a social science discipline with a descriptive focus, it needs to 
define its core criterion variable -- ethical behavior. But defining “what is ethical” is a 
prescriptive and not an empirical task (cf., Fortin & Fellenz, 2008) 
Several behavioral ethics researchers have attempted definitions. However, in so 
doing, they usually neglect normative definitions of ethicality, relying instead on consensus. 
Consensus, of course, is subject to change over time and often context dependent (e.g., 
Monin, Noorderhsaven, Vaara, & Kroon, 2013). For example, Treviño, Weaver, and 
Reynolds (2006) define behavioral ethics as “individual behavior that is subject to or judged 
according to generally accepted moral norms of behavior. Thus, research on behavioral ethics 
is primarily concerned with explaining individual behavior that occurs in the context of larger 
social prescriptions” (p. 952). 
Kluver et al. (2014) add a second standard, moral capital, defined as “the resources 
that sustain a moral community” (Haidt, 2012, p. 292). This includes social capital but also 
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an alignment among the community members’ moral psychology and the community’s norms 
and culture. According to the second standard, “moral actions are those that promote the 
moral capital of a firm” (Kluver et al., p. 154). To make sure that the second standard does 
not define behaviors as ethical at a community or group level that run counter to societal 
norms, Kluver and his colleagues argue that the two standards should be put together. 
Bazerman and Gino (2012) refer to two different standards in their definition of behavioral 
ethics. These are moral intuition and the broader benefits to society. Taken together, these 
examples illustrate that the field of behavioral ethics is still struggling with what is ethical, 
and which normative standards of ethical should be applied. Tenbrunsel and Crowe (2008) 
therefore argue for a bridge between descriptive and normative business ethics and for openly 
acknowledging that values are part of a field that deals with moral activity.  
Normative considerations within organizational justice. In organizational justice, 
the difference between normative frameworks of justice (“What is just?”) and perceptions of 
fairness has long been obscured by the interchangeable terminology for justice rules on the 
one hand and fairness perceptions on the other hand. In response to this problem, Goldman 
and Cropanzano (in press) argue that “Justice should be defined as adherence to rules of 
conduct, whereas fairness should be defined as individuals’ moral evaluations of this 
conduct” (p. 1). Thus, justice refers to conduct prescribed by a normative framework, 
whereas fairness is a perception of the moral worthiness of the rules and compliance with 
them. This definition builds on earlier work by Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas (2013), who 
make a similar distinction in the context of the justice and fairness of management control 
systems. Evidence regarding the measurement of perceived adherence to justice rules (so-
called indirect measures of justice) versus the measurement of fairness perceptions (so-called 
direct measures of justice) also suggests that both have different psychometric properties 
(Colquitt & Rodell, in press). In order to build fairer workplaces, it is important to consider 
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not only subjective or perceived fairness but also the underlying justice standards (Fortin & 
Fellenz, 2008). The recent efforts in the organizational justice literature to disentangle these 
issues in terms of both measurement and definition promise to clarify the field’s intersections 
with both normative or prescriptive justice and ethics or morality.  
Concluding thoughts. We note here that in our discussion of behavioral ethics, a 
distinction was made between the social science research on behavior that conformed to 
given ethical standards or norms and the philosophical discussion of prescriptive norms and 
rules. The justice literature has been struggling with a similar issue, as discussed above, with 
justice associated with prescriptive rules and norms of conduct and fairness being an ethical 
judgment of that conduct. In this analysis, justice and behavioral ethics take as a given the 
foundational values or principles that underlie prescriptive norms and standards of behavior.  
Good Versus Bad: The Moral Duality of Behavior Within Behavioral Ethics and 
Organizational Justice 
In both the domains of ethics and justice, behaviors may be categorized into opposing 
types (good vs. bad), rather than placed along a bipolar continuum (e.g., whereby lower 
“badness” is equivalent to greater “goodness,” and vice versa). The classification of 
behaviors as dichotomously ethical or unethical is an ancient concern reflected even in the 
earliest recorded religious philosophies. For instance, good-evil dualism existed in 
Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism. Christianity emphasized more challenging notions to the 
consideration of ethical duty through such parables as the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal 
Son. For modern researchers these categorical questions are reflected in contemporary 
research paradigms.  
Ethical vs. unethical conduct within behavioral ethics. In this regard, Treviño and 
her colleagues (2006) differentiate between three foci in the contemporary study of 
behavioral ethics.  
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 First, some researchers tend to focus on unethical behaviors (e.g. lying or 
stealing). We can view this as the presence or absence of bad, though not 
good, conduct.  
 Second, some scholars are interested in acts that are simply not unethical (e.g. 
being honest, obeying the law). We can view this as the presence or absence of 
good, though not bad, conduct. 
 Third, there is research that explores social behaviors that exceed minimum 
standards, obligations, or expectations (charitable giving and whistle-blowing). 
These investigations also focus on good behavior, though they implicitly 
recognize that some actions are more praiseworthy than others.  
Most studies in the field of behavioral ethics focus on exclusively one of these families of 
behaviors.  
 Just vs. unjust conduct within organizational justice. In the justice literature, the 
categorical differentiation between justice and injustice has recently come to the foreground 
(e.g., Kiersch, Byrne, Smith, & Weidert, 2011). Colquitt, Long, Rodell, and Gaenpola (in 
press, p. 1) provide a definition of “justice” as “the degree to which the rules identified in the 
literature are adhered to.” This stands in contrast to “injustice,” which is defined as “the 
degree to which the rules identified in the literature are violated.” These authors found that 
justice and injustice were independent concepts. They also observed that, although 
researchers sometimes imply that injustice has stronger effects, most existing measures 
capture only justice. Furthermore, Colquitt and colleagues (2014) found qualitative and 
quantitative evidence for differential effects of justice versus injustice. Each explained 
incremental variance for several types of outcomes. For example, justice rule violation (i.e., 
injustice) was especially relevant to contingent reactions of hostility and counterproductive 
work behavior. On the other hand, outcomes such as trust, self-esteem, task performance and 
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citizenship behaviors were strongly predicted by the adherence to justice rules. Colquitt and 
colleagues propose that these may be reactions typical for employees in promotion focus, 
when one is aspiring to achieve ideals and goals, which is possible under conditions of 
justice.  
 Consistent with the work of Colquitt and his colleagues (in press), Dulebohn, Conlon, 
Sarinopoulos, Davison, and McNamara (2010) found that different parts of the brain were 
active for justice vs. injustice judgments. There also seem to be differential memory effects. 
Cojuharenco and Patient (2013) found that recall of fair events produced a greater emphasis 
on distributive justice, whereas recall of unfair events produced greater emphasis on 
interactional justice.  
 Concluding thoughts. The tendency to place behaviors in categories – morally good 
vs. morally bad – has a long presence in human history. This dualistic approach has been 
carried forward, at least to some extent, in modern investigations of behavioral ethics and 
organizational justice. Interestingly, the duality often exists implicitly in the way that topics 
are selected for study (cf., Treviño et al., 2006). For all of that, people seem to be capable of 
distinguishing the morally extreme from the morally insignificant. Thus, there is a tendency 
to place things into dichotomous categories but to rank them within each set. If this is the 
case, and we concede that the possibility is somewhat speculative, then future research is 
needed about both continuous within-category judgments, as well as the relative weighting of 
good and bad behaviors (for example, see Birnbaum, 1972; 1973; Riskey & Birnbaum, 
1974). Beyond this, Kluver et al. (2014) argue that it is particularly interesting to consider 
how people shift back and forth between ethical and unethical acts. To investigate these 
complex patterns of behavior, studies are needed that can capture both the negative (unjust or 
unethical), as well as the positive (just, ethical) end of the spectrum.  Concepts in the 
behavioral ethics literature allow researchers to go beyond the mere compliance with norms 
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and minimum standards (which tends to be the focus of “justice”) and to include particularly 
positive behaviors in investigations.   
 
Hot Versus Cold Views on Human Decisions and Behaviors 
A third parallel challenge and development in both the ethical decision making and 
the organizational justice literature, is the growing recognition of the importance of affect in 
moral judgment (e.g., Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2010). While both literatures have 
traditionally respected the role of so-called “cold” cognition (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 
2006), researchers have paid increasing attention to the importance of “hot” moods and 
emotions (Fortin, Blader, Wiesenfeld, & Wheeler-Smith, in press; Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; 
Pfaff, 2007). 
Affect and behavioral ethics. Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) have studied social 
conventions and more universally accepted unethical acts. Haidt and his colleagues found 
that affective reactions to these types of situations are often antecedent to moral judgment. 
Indeed, moral judgments may be more of an “after the fact” justification of a spontaneous, 
intuitive, and affect-driven reaction to a situation or event (for a review, see Haidt, 2001).  
Research on self-conscious emotions is consistent with this view (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). Briefly, there are at least three self-conscious emotions: embarrassment, 
guilt, and shame (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Embarrassment has 
the least moral content, though it can help people behave well. It is an ill-feeling that results 
from violating a convention (e.g., dressing overly formally for an informal gathering). Guilt 
and shame have stronger moral implications, though they are somewhat different. Guilt 
occurs one hurts another person and does not perform an accepted duty. Shame occurs when 
one violates his or her personal standards (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Hill, 1996). Each of 
these self-conscious emotions helps to prevent unethical social behavior – embarrassment 
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moves us to conform to social expectations (Keltner, 2009, especially Chapter 5), guilt to 
make amends for our transgressions (Koneči, 1972), and shame to withdraw when something 
has gone seriously wrong (Tangney, 1995). When judging the morality of behaviors, disgust 
is another emotion that plays an important role (Haidt, 2006, especially Chapter 9). When 
people are made to feel disgusted, they tend to make harsher moral judgments (Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Conversely, when cleanliness is salient then people become 
less judgmental (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). Emotions, such as disgust, are important 
for moral thinking (Nichols, 2002).  
The importance of affectively-driven moral judgments are hard to reconcile with 
earlier research on rational moral decision making. Nevertheless, there are some promising 
attempts. It could be that context effects impact the extent to which the judgment relies on 
affect vs. careful and systematic thinking. In this regard, Monin, Pizarro, and Beer 
(2007) argue that people may follow a different decision process depending on how the moral 
situation is structured. If it is structured as a “moral dilemma,” where the trade-off between 
two moral rules becomes apparent, then conscious deliberation is likely. When, on the other 
hand, the situation does not imply a choice between two rules -- yet instead is somehow 
shocking or outraging -- then people tend to react in a more intuitive and affective fashion.  
Affect and organizational justice. The organizational justice literature has 
historically followed the cognitive appraisal model of emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), whereby justice cognitions are treated as antecedents of affect. 
There is certainly extensive evidence that people who experience injustice often experience 
considerable emotion (for reviews, see Cropanzano et al., 2010, especially Chapter 2; Fortin 
et al., in press). More relevant to our present analyses, and paralleling the behavioral ethics 
research discussed above, moods and emotions also cause justice perceptions (Cropanzano et 
al, Chapter 5), as well as reactions to injustice (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). For example, 
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Barsky and Kaplan (2007) found that positive affect was associated with greater perceived 
fairness, while negative affect was associated with less. Affect, it seems, plays a role in how 
we process fairness information (Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992).  
Concluding thoughts. Researchers have continued to debate the relative roles of 
affect and cognition (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This is a healthy dialogue, as both are certainly 
central (Greene, 2010). That said, it is important to reflect on the incompleteness of our 
current understanding. While we need to recognize the close connection between thinking 
and feeling, it remains for future research to fully articulate the role played by each.  
This Special Issue 
The nine articles that comprise this special issue investigate context effects among 
different actors: the organization, the group of employees, the individual employee, and the 
manager. For each of these  entities, these papers test behavioral science theories that 
describe the processes by which context impacts ethical judgments and behaviors. In so 
doing, these studies describe the complex and interactive dynamics of judgments and 
behaviors about fairness and ethics, as well as how they promote successful work 
organizations.  To illustrate these ideas, we review each of the articles below. We then reflect 
on how these studies can help in dealing with the three challenges we have outlined.  
Hansen et al.’s objective is to explore how employees form their perceptions of ethical 
climate in an organization. Based on Rupp (2011), the authors argue that because the social 
context at work is complicated, employees form ethical climate perceptions on the basis of 
cues that they receive from a variety of sources and experiences. This theory helps them to 
propose a "multi-experience model" of ethical climate development bridging concepts from 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR), ethics, and justice literatures. They find good 
support for their model: a company’s externally-focused CSR activities (how the company 
treats the communities outside of the organization) represent the contextual cue from which 
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employees infer the ethicality of their leaders and, in turn, their co-workers (see also, Mayer, 
Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, & Schminke, 2013). Hansen and colleagues also show that 
these effects are stronger for employees who have a higher propensity to trust.  
Melkonian, Soenen, and Ambrose also deal with antecedent variables stemming from 
the organization. Using Trope and Liberman’s (2010) elegant construal theory, they explore 
how employees use their anticipatory justice judgments to make decisions on whether they 
will cooperate in a context of organizational change. Operationalizing psychological distance 
as information or knowledge about a planned merger, Melkonian and colleagues test, and 
find good support, for a model whereby the positive relationship between employees’ 
anticipations of overall justice and their intentions to cooperate with the organization’s 
strategy is stronger when informational distance is higher rather than lower. In contrast, the 
association between employees’ use of more specific facet justice judgments to decide about 
their engagement is stronger when informational distance is low and they feel more 
knowledgeable about the change.  
In contrast to the first two papers, Thornton and Rupp take a new perspective adapted 
to the prevalence of group-based structures in organizations. They propose a model grounded 
in social exchange, deonance, and fairness heuristic theories (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; 
Folger, 2001; Lind, 2001) that predicts group prosocial and deviant behavior on the basis of 
an interaction between the group level moral identity of employees (Aquino & Reed, 2002) 
and perceptions of organizational CSR and justice climate. In an experimental setting they 
find that group prosocial behaviors were higher when overall justice climate and CSR were 
perceived to be high and deviant behaviors higher when overall justice climate and CSR were 
low. Notably, the effect of justice on either prosocial or deviant behaviors was strongest when 
CSR was also strong, demonstrating a contextual boundary effect when two perceptions are 
inconsistent and conflicting.  
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At the individual level, Barclay and Saldanha propose a very creative perspective on 
the management of unfairness at work. Their fundamental assumption is that employees are 
able to cope with experiences and feelings of injustice, forgive the offender, and move on 
from the offense, but only when the context is favorable. Based on theories of emotional 
inhibition (e.g. Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987), emotional processing (e.g., Lepore, 
Greenberg, Bruno, & Smyth, 2002), and cognitive adaptation (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1992), the 
authors find that allowing employees to express their emotions, cognitively process what 
happened, and consider forgiveness, all contributes to a feeling that the situation has been 
resolved. This in turn helps them to forgive the offender and reap the benefits of forgiveness 
such as well-being and the repair of the relationship. Importantly, their study shows that a 
very simple intervention that encourages employees to express their emotions and thoughts 
through writing, can provide a context that can help reduce the physiological and 
psychological demands associated with inhibition, address the fear and anxiety that have 
arisen from the experience, and help people engage in sense making.  
The five remaining papers of this special issue place an emphasis on the role, 
leadership capacities, and behaviors of managers. The first three papers identify important 
contextual predictors of managers’ ethical and fair behaviors. On the basis of self-awareness 
theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), Whiteside and Barclay propose that 
when the context emphasizes managers’ self-awareness (for example when managers can see 
their faces when communicating though a video system such as Skype), this makes them 
more likely to engage in interpersonally fair behaviors. The authors find support for this 
effect and also that it is especially salient for managers who are low on trait empathy, which 
usually makes them less inclined to behave interpersonally fairly.  
Bonner, Greenbaum, and Mayer explore how managers’ moral disengagement allows 
them to rationalize their unfair and unethical behaviors. According to the moral 
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disengagement literature (Bandura, 1990, 1999, 2002; Moore et al., 2012) people may be 
motivated to reframe unethical or unfair behaviors so that they appear more morally 
acceptable, to distance themselves from the harmful effects of these behaviors, and to reduce 
identification with victims. Moore et al. (2012) have established that moral disengagement 
can be an individual difference, with some people having a greater propensity to disengage 
morally from their actions than others. According to Bonner and colleagues, the more 
managers are morally disengaged, the less they are seen as ethical, and this is especially so in 
the eyes of those employees who have themselves a low level of moral disengagement.  
Moreover, supervisory moral disengagement has a negative impact on the performance and 
organizational citizenship behaviors of employees. For these reasons, authors recommend 
building organizational contexts that avoid moral disengagement and its deleterious effects, 
for example through ethics training.  
Letwin, Wo,  Folger, Rice, Taylor, Richard and Taylor investigate another individual 
difference for managers, the ethical perspective of managers, differentiating between 
deontological (behaviors are judged as right or wrong based on principles) versus utilitarian 
(behaviors are ethical if their consequences are good for the greatest number). This study 
finds that deontological managers are more likely to be considered ethical by both 
subordinates and their own managers, whereas utilitarian leaders are more likely to be seen as 
delivering a higher level of performance. Interestingly, despite the correlation with 
performance judgments, the managers’ own line managers do not judge those who are higher 
on utilitarianism as more worthy of promotion. 
The final two papers also deal with managers’ leadership but in a very different way. 
Long explores how managers promote fairness as a day-to-day activity in the concrete 
context of their jobs. He finds that managers’ main motivations for fairness consist of 
building positive relationships with their subordinates and in influencing subordinates’ level 
  BEYOND THE PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL                                                          16 
 
of work effort. Fostering work effort makes them engage in developing employees and in 
allocating fair rewards and responsibilities. By contrast, fostering positive relationships with 
their subordinates makes them engage in fairness promotion activities such as demonstrating 
moral leadership and enacting managerial propriety. These two activities in turn make 
managers engage in concrete actions such as allocating fair rewards and responsibilities, 
applying procedures fairly and exchanging information about managerial decisions. This 
study suggests that fairness promotion is in fact completely embedded in the context of 
managers’ jobs and represents an intrinsic part of it.  
Finally, Leavitt, Zhu, and Aquino provide a highly original piece examining 
managers’ unconscious ethical leadership processes. Building on the theory of moral 
intuitions (Lieberman, 2000), Leavitt and his colleagues explore how subtle contextual cues 
can be more important than conscious deliberation when predicting managers’ moral choices. 
More specifically, they show that priming the moral identity of managers makes them less 
likely to implicitly associate “business” with “ethical,” which in turn leads to a broader moral 
concern for external organizational stakeholders. The authors conclude that since a lack of 
morality can be unconscious, organizations should fight it by building work contexts that 
make moral identity unconsciously more salient.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the nine papers of this special issue shed new light on the role of context in 
the dynamics of ethics, fairness, and performance. Some of the contextual variables that have 
been investigated stem from the organization, such as informational distance (Melkonian, 
Soenen & Ambrose) and CSR (Hansen et al.). Other contexts are more closely related to 
employees themselves, such as employees’ expression (Barclay & Saldanha) and employees’ 
group moral identity (Thornton & Rupp). As for managers, three papers show the importance 
of characteristics and states -- such as self-awareness (Whiteside & Barclay), moral 
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disengagement (Bonner, Greenbaum, & Mayer) or managers’ utilitarian or deontological 
ethical ideology (Letwin et al.). The two final papers show how fairness in the concrete 
context of work is intrinsic to the role of managers (Long) and how unconscious cues may 
make managers’ morality more salient (Leavitt et al.).  
The papers presented here also illustrate the three current challenges and 
developments in the ethics and justice literature that we reviewed above. First, with regards to 
the interface of social-scientific with normative-philosophical study, we find that some of the 
papers (explicitly or implicitly) focus on the compliance of behavior with specific ethics and 
justice rules. For example, Whiteside and Barclay focus on interactional justice rules, and 
Leavitt and Aquino study implicit moral frameworks as an important aspect of people’s 
morality. We find it encouraging that several studies included not only measures designed to 
capture specific norms or manipulations of specific norms but also measures of more general 
impressions of fairness or ethics (e.g., Melkonian, Soenen & Ambrose; Barclay & Saldanha). 
Such studies allow researchers to more clearly differentiate between rule compliance versus 
judgments about rules and compliance. Interesting in this respect are the three quantitative 
papers concerned with ethical leadership (Bonner, Greenbaum & Mayer;  Letwin et al., 
Hansen et al.), all of which measure ethical leadership through a mix of more general 
impressions or judgments (e.g. conducts his personal life in an ethical mananer)  and more 
specific questions regarding the compliance with specific norms (e.g. when making decisions, 
asks what is the right thing to do). It seems that the ethical leadership literature may benefit 
from more explicitly differentiating between these two aspects, as has only recently been 
done in the justice literature (c.f. Goldman & Cropanzano, in press). 
Second, the collection of studies presented here also focus on different aspects of the 
duality of “ethical” and “just” versus “unethical” and “unjust”. For example, spirals of 
injustice (Barclay and Saldanha) are considered as well as positive promotion and enactment 
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of justice (Whiteside & Barclay; Long). Both negative and positive concepts from the ethics 
literature are represented – for example, Greenbaum & Mayer study moral disengagement 
while Leavitt, Zhu and Aquino investigate when managers will be more likely to show moral 
concern for external stakeholders. Building on these studies, we hope to also see future 
research that is able to capture both positive as well as negative behaviors in the same study. 
Third and last, the studies draw on a mix of hot versus cold views on human decisions 
and behaviors. In the tradition of the “hot view”, considering affect as a central mechanism, 
stands for example the study by Barclay & Saldanha (emotions as a mediator of justice 
effects). On the other hand, Long’s rationalized accounts of justice enactment and 
Melkonian’s et al. application of construal level theory tap into important cognitive 
mechanisms and may therefore be more closely related to the “cold view”. A very exciting 
approach is taken by Thornton and Rupp, who provide competing hypotheses based on the 
hot versus cold views of justice. Interestingly, Leavitt, Zhu, and Aquino’s paper takes another 
approach, showing that cold and hot processes may be at stake at the same time but at an 
unconscious level.  
Finally, we find it noteworthy that the papers presented here concern different stages 
of the process ranging from the formation of justice or ethics judgments to reactions and 
counter-reactions and to possible remedies after transgressions have occurred. This is another 
area where the ethics and justice literatures can enrich each other, as the justice literature has 
traditionally focused more strongly on reactions to justice events (i.e. investigating justice as 
independent variable or starting point), while the ethics literature has tended to pay more 
heed to the predictors of ethical behavior (i.e. investigating ethical behavior as dependent 
variable or end point).  We see some exciting extensions to this tradition in our set of papers. 
For example, Whiteside and Barclay investigate justice motivation, which parallels moral 
awareness often investigated in the ethics literature. Bonner, Greenbaum & Mayer investigate 
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the links between managers’ moral awareness, employee awareness and employee reactions. 
Letwin et al. even consider the longer-term career consequences of ethical leadership. 
Melkonian and colleagues on the contrary start their theorizing even before justice events 
occur, by considering the role of anticipations. Through shedding light on different temporal 
stages of ethics and justice processes, future researchers will be in a better position to build 
more complete process theories of justice and ethics in organizations. Importantly, some of 
the papers presented here focus explicitly on interventions. That is, beyond describing what 
can go wrong, researchers are moving on to investigate which specific remedies may make 
organizational contexts better.  
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